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1. SUMMARY: The State of Utah challenges the CAlO's 
decision that the United States holds title to land under Utah 
Lake. The State of Utah contends (1) that the evidence of Con-
~
gress' s intent in the Sundry Appropriations Act of 1888 to re-




the presumption that Utah acquired title to the land at statehood 
under the Equal Footing Doctrine, and (2) that only a conveyance 
of land under navigable water, and not merely a reservation or 
withdrawal of the land by Congress, is necessary to deny a state 
its entitlement to the land. 
/ 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: The original thirteen 
states own the lands underlying navigable waters within their 
boundaries as the sovereign successors to the English throne. 
Under a constitutional doctrine known as the "Equal Footing Doc-
trine," all subsequently admitted states enter the Union on an 
equal footing with the original thirteen states and so they too 
hold title to lands underlying navigable waters. See Pollard's 
Lessee v. Hagan, 44 u.s. (3 How.) 212 (1845). Before a state 
enters the Union, the United States holds the land under naviga-
ble waters in trust for the subsequently admitted states. Once 
the state enters the Union, however, these lands belong to the 
newly admitted state, and the state's "title to lands underlying 
navigable waters within its boundaries ~ conferred not by Con-
gress but by the Constitution itself." Oregon v. Corvallis Sand 
& Gravel Co., 429 u.s. 363, 374 (1977). 
Congress has the power, however, to make conveyances of land 
under navigable waters. Because of the trust relationship, two 
conditions must be satisfied in order for Congress to make such a 
conveyance: 1) the conveyance must be made before the state is 
admitted to the Union, and 2) the conveyance / ust be made for 
"some international duty or public exigency." Montana v. United 
States, 450 u.s. 544, 552 (1981). If such a pre-statehood con-
- 3 -
veyance is made, the state will not gain title to the land upon 
admission to the Union. 
/ 
This case involves a dispute between the United States and 
Utah over title to the land under Utah Lake, a navigable body of 
water covering !§0 square miles. Several years before the entry 
of Utah into the Union, Congress passed the Sundry Appropriations 
Act of 1988, 25 Stat. 505, 526-27, which authorized the United 
States Geological Survey to select "sites for reservoirs and oth-
er hydraulic works for irrigation and the prevention of floods 
and overflows." More importantly for purposes of this case, the 
Act also provided that the United States would reserve the sites 
that might be so selected: 
all the lands which may hereafter be desig-
nated or selected • • • for sites for reser-
voirs are from this time henceforth hereby 
reserved from sale as the property of the 
United States, and shall not be subject after 
the passage of this act, to entry, settlement 
or occupation until further provided by law. 
2 5 stat • 52 7 • 
The United States Geological Survey exercised its authority 
under the Act and reserved the bed of Utah Lake as a reservoir 
site in 1889. The United States, however, never used the lake as 
a reservoir site. In 1896, Utah obtained statehood. 
In 1976, the Bureau of Land Management issued oil and gas 
leases on the lakebed. This led Utah to file an action in DC for 
declaratory judgment that the 1889 withdrawal of Utah Lake did 
not deprive Utah of its title to the lakebed, to quiet title and 
for confirmation of the State's title under the Submerged Lands 
Act, 43 u.s.c. § 1311. 
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The DC granted the United States' motion for summary judg-
ment and quieted title to the lakebed in the United States. The 
DC noted that the United States Geological Survey used language 
in its correspondence and documents surrounding the 1889 with-
drawal that expressly included the bed of Utah Lake, and the DC 
found that the United States withdrew the bed of Utah Lake as 
part of the 1889 reservoir site selection. In response to Petr's 
argument that the Equal Footing Doctrine passed title in the 
lakebed to Utah when Utah gained statehood, the DC noted that the 
Equal Footing Doctrine includes an exception for withdrawals made 
"after acquiring the terri tory and before the creation of the 
state' for the carrying out of 'public purposes appropriate to 
the objects for which the territory was held.'" Petr. App. 39a-
40a (quoting United States v. Holt, 270 u.s. 49, 54-55 (1926). 
Because the irrigation for the benefit of future settlers of the 
West was such a purpose, the 1889 withdrawal was valid and Utah 
did not gain title to the lakebed when he entered the Union. 
The CAlO affirmed. The CAlO began by noting that "'[a] 
court deciding a question of title to the bed of a navigable 
water must ••• begin with a strong presumption against conveyance 
by the United States • • • and must not infer such a conveyance 
unless the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made 
plain.'" Petr. App. 7a-8a (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 
U.S. 551-552 (1981). According to the CAlO, therefore, the issue 
on appeal was whether this presumption had been overcome "by some 
'definitely declared' or 'plain' intent to withdraw the bed of 
Utah Lake 'because of some international duty or public exigen-
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cy.'" Petr. App. 9a (quoting Montana, 450 u.s., at 552). Al-
though it recognized that the principles of the Equal Footing 
Doctrine referred specifically only to pre-statehood conveyances, 
the CAlO asserted that the same principles also apply to pre-
statehood reservations and withdrawals such as that in this case, 
citing United States v. City of Anchorage, 437 F.2d 1081, 1084-85 
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Alaska, 423 F.2d 764, 766-68 
(9th Ci r. 1970). 
The~AlO concluded that the United States intended to select 
the entire lakebed as part of the 1899 reservoir selection, and 
that the Sundry Appropriations Act of 1888 imposed no restriction 
on the type of land that the United States Geological Survey 
could select. The CAlO thus rejected Petr' s argument that the 
Act did not include authorization to select the beds of navigable 
waters. Finally, the CAlO rejected Petr's argument that there 
existed no "public exigency" justifying the withdrawal. It be-
lieved that the purpose of irrigation for the benefit of future 
settlers of the arid West was a public purpose motivated by a 
public exigency. Thus, Utah did not gain title to the lakebed at 
statehood, because a valid withdrawal was made by the United 
States in 1889. 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
PETITIONER'S CONTENTIONS 
(1) Petr first contends that the DC and CAlO failed to apply 
the standards and presumptions mandated by the Constitution's 
Equal Footing Doctrine. Although a pre-statehood conveyance can 
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defeat a claim that a state has title in land under navigable 
waters, this Court in Montana reconfirmed the principle that such 
a conveyance must only be made for "some international duty or 
public exigency," 450 u.s., at 552, and noted that such a convey-
ance must not be lightly inferred. There is a "strong presump-
tion" against a conveyance of land under navigable waters and 
Congress's intent to make such a conveyance must be "definitely 
declared or otherwise made [very] plain,""in clear and especial 
words," or the valid muniment of title must "in terms embrace[] 
the land under the waters of the stream." Id. The 1888 Act re-
flects no such intent. As even the CAlO notes, the Act is silent 
on whether it authorized the reservation of land under navigable 
waters. A principal reason this Court upheld the State's title 
in Montana was the fact that the Indian treaties that purportedly 
conveyed the land in dispute was similarly silent ori whether it 
included land under navigable waters. Id., at 554. Yet the CAlO 
deprived Utah of title because of this silence in direct conflict 
with this Court's approach in Montana. 
(2) Petr further contends that the history of the Act also 
establishes that Congress never intended it to authorize reserva-
tion of lands under navigable waters. Such land is "sovereign 
land" that was not subject to public selection, settlement or 
entry under the public-land laws even before the 1888 Act. The 
Act, however, provides that the selected land "shall not be sub-
ject ••• to entry, settlement or occupation." The Act was passed 
in response to the activity of "land-grabbers" who used the land 
laws to take control of the most valuable irrigable public lands 
.. 
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and reservoir sites. The Act remedied this problem by authoriz-
ing the United States Geological Survey to make appropriate with-
drawals of irrigation and reservoir sites. Because sovereign 
lands were not subject to public sale even before 1888, land 
under navigable waters was not affected by "land grabbing", and 
hence the Act does not address sovereign lands. 
(3) Even if the Act authorized the reservation of sovereign 
lands, however, Petr contends that Utah Lake's reservation cannot 
be justified by a "public exigency." The CAlO erred by requiring 
only "[a] public purpose motivated by a public exigency." This 
is a substantial dilution of the true standard, which requires 
proof of a "public exigency." A "public purpose" is not suffi-
cient. See Montana ·, 450 u.s., at 556. No such public exigency 
can be found in Congress's desire to facilitate irrigation. Re-
gardless of who had title to the lakebed, the lake would be 
available for irrigation. 
(4) Finally, Petr notes that "this Court has never allowed a 
State's Equal Footing entitlement to be denied except upon a 
final conveyance of federal title •••• " Petr. App. 19. A feder-
al reservation or withdrawal of land -- without a conveyance 
is not enough to defeat the Equal Footing entitlement. This is 
an important issue because federal withdrawals and reservations 
are common. Only compelling needs giving rise to a definitely 
expressed final conveyance -- in which the federal government's 
title is extinguished in its entirety, leaving nothing for the 
state to succeed to should be the basis for denying the 
state's entitlement. 
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AMICI CURIAE CONTENTIONS 
Thirty states have filed an amici curiae brief in support 
of Petr's application for a writ of certiorari. The Amici Brief 
elaborates on Petr' s fourth contention that a reservation --
without a conveyance to a third party -- is insufficient to deny 
· a state's Equal Footing entitlement to title in lands below navi-
gable waters. 
( 1) The Amici note that this Court has never held or even 
suggested that a federal withdrawal of lands under navigable wa-
ters will defeat a state's title to such lands. In United States 
v. California, 436 u.s. 32 (1978), this Court held that a federal 
withdrawal of submerged lands, prior to the enactment of the Sub-
merged Lands Act, 43 u.s.c. § 1301, did not defeat a state's 
title to those lands under the Act. The Submerged Lands Act was 
enacted to extend the principles of the Equal Footing Doctrine to 
submerged lands underlying the terri tor ial sea. Surely, Amici 
argue, if a pre-Submerged Lands Act withdrawal cannot defeat a 
state's statutory title, a pre-statehood withdrawal cannot defeat 
a state's constitutional sovereign title under the Equal Footing 
Doctrine. 
(2} The Amici urge that the distinction between a conveyance 
to a third party and a federal withdrawal is a substantive dis-
tinction. When the United States has conveyed the land under 
navigable waters, both ownership and sovereignty are severed, and 
no attributes of ownership remain to be transferred to the new 
state. In the case of a federal withdrawal, on the other hand, 
the United States has not conveyed the lands to a third party, 
- 9 -
but instead has merely withdrawn the lands from the operation of 
the public land laws. The lands remain in federal hands and thus 
remain subject to the constitutional trust in favor of future 
states. Cf California, 436 u.s., at 40 ("A reservation ••• thus 
means no more than that the land is shifted from one federal use, 
and perhaps from one federal managing agency, to another"). The 
problem with the CAlO's analysis is that it makes a newly-
admitted state's title in these lands hinge on whether it was 
admitted to statehood before or after a federal withdrawal. 
(3) Finally, the amici urge that this issue is an important 
one. The issue involves not "substantive property law as such, 
but rather with an issue substantially related to the constitu-
tional sovereignty of the States." Amici Br. 10 (quoting Oregon 
v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 u.s. 363, 381 (1977)1_. In 
addition to the attempt to transfer interests in the bed of Utah 
Lake to third parties, the United States' attempts to transfer 
lands under navigable waters to third parties in reliance on pre-
statehood federal withdrawal are at issue in five cases pending 
in Alaska and in United States v. Alaska (No. 84, Original), now 
pending in this Court. 
RESPONSE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL 
The SG filed a response that addresses most, but not all of 
the contentions of Petr and Amici. 
( 1) The SG argues that the selection and reservation of 
Utah Lake was for a "public purpose[] appropriate to the objects 
for which the United States h[e]ld the Territory" and that the 
United States responded to a "public exigency" in doing so. The 
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opening of the arid West to homesteading raised the danger that 
settlers might claim lands more suitable to reservoirs and irri-
gation works, and the reservation of Utah Lake as a reservoir 
lake was a response to the resulting public exigency. Contrary 
to Petr's App., the S.G. contends that the CAlO applied the prin-
ciples contained in Montana. The CAlO required a public exigency 
and the CAlO 's application of settled principles to this cases 
does not merit review by this Court. Although the CAlO used the 
phrase "a public purpose motivated by a public exigency," there 
is no indication that the CAlO intended a departure from Montana. 
In any event, a "public exigency" is not a constitutional re-
quirement, but instead is a guide to Congressional intent. See 
Montana, 450 u.s., at 556. Here the intent to reserve the 
lakebed is clear because the United States expressly reserved the 
Utah Lake bed. 
(2) In response to the contention that the 1888 Act did not 
expressly authorize the reservation of the lakebed, the SG con-
tends that no express reference is needed so long as Congress's 
intent to include sovereign lands is "'otherwise made very 
plain.'" Id., at 552 (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 
270 u.s. 49, 55 (1926). In this case, the Act was broad in its 
coverage and expressly covered "all the lands" that might be des-
ignated as a reservoir site. Moreover, Congress was made aware 
of the reservation of the Utah Lake bed, but took no action to 
repudiate this reservation. 
(3) Finally, the SG contends that the practical importance 
of the ownership of the bed of Utah Lake is small because the 
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leases issued by the the Bureau of Land Management are about to 
expire and no drilling permits were ever issued for the produc-
tion of oil and gas from the bed of the lake. 
(4) Unfortunately, the SG does not respond to the conten-
tion made briefly by Petr, and extensively by Amici, that the 
reservation or withdrawal of land under navigable waters does not 
--unlike a conveyance-- act to eliminate the state's Equal Foot-
ing Doctrine entitlement to the land. 
4. DISCUSSION: {_(DC? ~ 4_i-~~ ~t.. 
(a) Issues Involving the 1888 Act 
Montana v. United States, 450 u.s. 544 (1981) provides the 
most recent exposition of th~ual Footing Doctrine. The issue 
in Montana was whether the United States had conveyed ownership 
of the riverbed of the Big Horn River to the Crow Indian Tribe by 
treaties in 1851 and 1868. The Court held that the treaties did 
not convey ownership. It emphasized that a conveyance of land --
under navigable waters can only be inferred when Congress's in-
tention is clear: 
But because control over the property under-
lying navigable waters is so strongly identi-
fied with the sovereign power of government, 
it will not be held that the United States 
has conveyed such land except because of 
"some international duty or public exigency." 
A court deciding a question of title to the 
bed of a navigable water must, therefore, 
begin with a strong presumption against con-
veyance by the United States and. must not 
infer such a conveyance · "unless the intention 
was definitely declared or otherwise made 
plain," or was rendered "in clear and espe-
cial words," or "unless the claim confirmed 
in terms embraces the land under the waters 
of the stream." 
Id., at 552 (citations omitted). 
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The Court in Montana concluded that the treaties failed to 
overcome the presumption that the beds of navigable waters are 
held in trust for newly admitted states because the treaties did 
not expressly refer to the riverbed and there was also not an 
intent to convey such lands expressed in clear and especial 
words. Although the Court recognized that it had found a convey-
ance of a riverbed in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 u.s. 620 
(1970), it viewed Choctaw Nation as "a singular exception" and 
noted that an usual history of the treaties, and a promise to the 
tribe that no part of the reservation would ever become a part of 
a state, overcame the presumption in that case. 
. v" 
I bel~eve that the CAlO's decision is inconsistent with Mon-
tana. The CAlO concluded that the 1888 Act authorized the reser-
vation of lands below navigable waters because the Act provided 
such broad reservation powers and imposed no restriction on the 
United States Geological Survey's power to reserve lands. Clear-
ly, this is inconsistent with Montana, in which this very silence 
was taken as strong evidence of the lack of such an intent. The 
CAlO's approach actually creates a presumption that the Act de-
nies the state title by inferring such a denial by silence. Fur-
thermore, there is little else indicating an intent by Congress 
to reserve sovereign lands. The intent of Congress was to pre-
vent "land grabbing, n and sovereign lands were not subject to 
public sale. Thus, no purpose would have been served by reserv-
ing sovereign land. 
I do not believe, however, that this issue merits plenary 
review. Although the CAlO is in error and failed to apply the 
- 13 -
Montana presumption, this issue is necessarily fact-bound. What 
is in dispute is whether the 1888 Act displays enough evidence of 
a congressional intent to reserve sovereign lands to overcome the 
Montana presumption. The CAlO purported to apply the Montana 
presumption, and its error seems to be in applying the presump-
tion. One factor, however, may support certiorari in this case. 
The CAlO includes a large proportion of those states most affect-
ed by the Equal Footing Doctrine; thus, the CAlO's erroneous ap-
plication of the Montana presumption could have some import. 
Still, given that the real dispute in this case is over Con-
gress's intent in passing the 1888 Act, a resolution of this case 
is unlikely to add anything to Montana. 
(b) Issue Raised by Amici 
The issue emphasized in the Amici Brief -- that a withdrawal 
or reservation by Congress cannot act to deny a state its enti-
tlement to lands under navigable waters -- may well merit plenary 
review. Only the CA9 and the CAlO (in the instant case) have 
addressed this issue, and both have concluded that a reservation 
or withdrawal has the same effect on the states' entitlement as a 
conveyance. See United States v. City of Anchorage, 437 F.2d 
1081, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Alaska, 423 F.2d 
764, 766-68 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 u.s. 967 (1970). Nei-
ther of these circuits give much analysis for their approach. In 
Alaska, for example, the CA9 merely asserted that "[b]eyond ques-
tion, the [United States] had power, prior to Alaskan statehood, 
to withhold, withdraw or convey the land and water for any valid 
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purpose," 423 F.2d, at 766, and cited three cases that involved 
conveyances, and not reservations or withdrawals. Because of the 
nature of the entitlement at stake, only recently admitted states 
are likely to be affected by this issue. Thus, only the CAlO and 
CA9 are likely to ever address this issue. I believe that plena-
ry review may be warranted because the approach taken by these 
circuits seems to be in error. 
This Court has never even suggested that a reservation or 
withdrawal of land will defeat a state's entitlement to land 
under navigable waters. All of the cases to address the Equal 
Footing Doctrine have involved conveyances. Indeed, in United 
States v. Utah, 283 u.s. 64, 88 (1931), the Court concluded that 
an Executive Order that withdrew lands from sale and settlement 
did not "constitute a grant," and thus held that Utah held title 
to the riverbed of the Colorado River. Analytically, a reserva-
tion or withdrawal is quite different from a conveyance. In a 
conveyance to a third party, the United States loses its title to 
the land, and thus need no longer hold the land in trust for a 
state. The theory behind the exception to the Equal Footing Doc-
trine for land conveyed to a third party is that rights granted 
to third parties by the United States are not eliminated by the 
entry of a new state into the Union: 
It is settled law in this country that lands 
underlying navigable waters within a State 
belong to a State in its sovereign capacity 
• • • subject to the qualification that where 
the United States, after acquiring the terri-
tory and before the creation of the State, 
has granted rights in such lands by way of 
performing international obligations, or 
effecting the use or improvement of the lands 
for the purposes of commerce among the States 
- 15 -
and with foreign nations, or carrying out 
other public purposes appropriate to the ob-
jects for which the territory was held, such 
ri$hts are not cut off by the subsequent ere= 
at1on of the State, but r ern a in unimpaired, 
and the rights which otherwise would pass to 
the State in virtue of its admission into the 
Union are restricted or qualified according-
ly. 
United States v. Holt Bank, 270 u.s. 49, 55 (1926) (emphasis sup-
plied). By inference, the state obtains those rights still re-
tained by the United States at the time the state gains state-
hood. 
A reservation or withdrawal, however, "means no more than 
that the land is shifted from one federal use, and perhaps from 
one federal managing agency, to another." United States v. Cali-
fornia, 436 u.s., at 40. In the case of the 1888 Act, reserva-
tion simply meant that the land was no longer subject to public 
sale. The difficulty of the approach taken by the two circuits 
is that it fails to explain why this simple change in the federal 
use to which the land is put can eliminate the trust obligation 
of the federal government to the future states. 
I 
This issue has much more imp~ance than the specific appli-
cation of Montana by the CAlO. Pre-statehood reservations and 
withdrawals by the federal government were common in the West, 
and thus the title to several lakebeds and riverbeds may well be 
at stake. According to Amici, title to withdrawn land is now at 
issue in several cases now pending in Alaska. 
Unfortunately, however, the SG response does not discuss ~ 
this issue, and nothing suggests whether this issue was raised by 
Petr in the courts below. Although the CAlO addresses this 
!' 
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issue, it is not clear from the opinion whether this was in re-
sponse to argument by Petr or simply raised by the Court sua 
sponte. Indeed, the Petr only discusses this issue briefly in 
its application, see Petr. App. 19-20, and most of the arguments 
on this issue are only elaborated by the Amici in a brief filed 
after the SG filed his response. Because of the SG's silence on 
this issue, and the possibility that this issue was not raised in 
the courts below, I recommend that Court call for a supplemental 
response on this issue. 
I recommend that the SG BE REQUESTED TO FILE A SUPPLE-
MENTAL RESPONSE. 
There is a response. 
August 1, 1986 Blanchard opn in petn 
v ocea on .............................. j=>IJI?:t:;~Jlloe r .t. ':J, 1 ':J ts t> 
Argued ................................ , 19 ..... . Assigned ............................. , 19 ..... . No. 
Submitted ............................ , 19 ..... . Announced .......................... , 19 .... .. 85-1772 
UTAH DIV. OF STATE LANDS 
vs. 
u.s. 
HOLD CERT. JURISDICTIONAL MERITS MOTION STATEMENT 
FOR 






ABSENT NOT VOTING 





Brennan, J .............................................................................................................. .. 
White, J. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . ............ ~I(. .......................................................................... . 
Marshall, J. . .. . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . ·II'·....... . . .. . . . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . ........................................... . 
Blackmun, J ........................ !('/···· ........................................................................ . 
Powell, J ............................. ~7 ............................................................................ . Stevens, J ................................................................................................................ . 
O'Connor, J ......................... (. ................................................................................ .. 
Scalia, J ................................................................................................................... . 
19019-9-86 
of fu Ct.v<a_/ysts j/J --hw ~9:111'1 bul-
--houJ ftfh,_2 ~o. T a.M :i!e;3 CC711tltf1CRJ ~ 
--/neue -hu_ turt/e.r :-z;;:~a.-1 75u C/1/0 c£gct.f/Vf/l 
Cvn~lrcls w/ftt .A./~~a_ -- ~?arlo/~ 
/9~ /1-c/- C/1/ //} J5?/J /Ylf?/VJtJ s)dw.s ?'nC<./ as_ 
Was n"l '1sd!e-u ( "a.s -h rf'.u.ruwy n....e. U&.-4 6.16 
&d. { fu pp ~ n), So I tAJ/'"e ~,;z/ e...u./ N /Jd,L 
/Jar;-UA.<j_/ ~ 7hiJ ?(//;;?( __ ,_ ----- ---~ 
I aho a~~ ~oc:J/,1 ftl«/- ~ 6/w-,-e/ 
drs lvvtc ~(/1/7 k ~  CL '~et:er~ ~ rr CvtAJ CL. 
'' ('17V1 ~r a-uc e.J' IS /-ro v 6 &,.r. e .. 7l.e Vrt"euf 0/ ~ 
SG- shout/ )e~ ~ ;~ &od{ v.;,[ept& ~ (};) 




rjm 02/14/87 3/1.  ~ 
~~-a~~~.-9~Jv 
~~~~~f-~~~­
c:~~ ..-t-<_ ~" ~~ 9 ~~ 
~ 1/lA.J.-~~~ /~Y.r~~ J"2.2_ 
A/t-~ ~ ~~~ ...:.:.~~c/1--ID 
~~·~~~l 
.:3/~----?'~ ! 9 ~~~ t:::/4-ID 
,.------ ~ ~ ~J'. ~ u. 5"_ 
~d.- f"2-~1~ ~ 
9 ~~~k.J._ ~ 91- L--t.- ~~4 ,_ 
~-~-~ U.5. L~,,~ to 
~tl~~4(.__ 
BENCH MEMORANDUM - 4J 
~-~ 
To: Justice Powell February 14, 1987 ~~~ 
-
From: Ronald f 1- L--t... ~~ ~ ~ 
No. 85-1772, State of Utah v. United States ~, ~ 
~,, 
Cert to CAlO (Holloway (CJ), Doyle, Logan) ~ ... •••. f-~ 
A4 c:::::;.. ., \ 
Set for oral argument Monday March 23 (first case) ~~'
-~~~ 
~4-~ . . 
-------------------------------------------------~-~~-;F~ r~ 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED: 1. Whether a reservati_ h .... __ ·the. United ~ ... 
~~~~~ ~ 
States is sufficient to defeat a State's entitl m J ~e 
Equal Footing Doctrine to lands beneath navigable~: s~ ~ LtJ n r=:.. 
2. If so, whether the reservations a~rhz ed by the .c-
/~~Aq)f 
Sundry Appropriations Act of 1888 defeat Utah's ~im t bed 
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
a 150-square-mile freshwater lake in Utah. 
came a State in 18 96, it has believed it owned the ~.IZ.t!:.~~--~_ - Jl ,, 
Accordingly, .tt. 5 ~ 
~I F'1 ~ 
it consistently has regulated use, management, and control of the 
bed of the lake under the Equal Footing doctrine. 
lake. In 1976, the Federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) began 
issuing oil and gas leases for mineral beneath the lake. BLM 
rested its title on the Sundry Appropriations Act of~ That 
statute provided funds 
land. 
Utah brought this suit seeking a declaration that it has 
title to the lake. The de found that the United States had title ~C Y-
~o the lake. On appeal, CAlO affirmed. CAlO noted that the Sur-
~~vt .- ~ 
.• ' was authorized by the Sundry Appropriations Act of 1888. 
There was no exception on the face of that act for land beneath 
navigable waters. Because the terms of the Act covered the bed 
of the lake, the reservation was effective to prevent the land 
from passing to Utah when Utah became a State. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR expressed particular interest in the S t)'C y 
case, because it presents a fact situation quite common in the J...H..~!-
'-- Western part of the country. After relisting the case, she voted ---------
t 
3. 
to grant, and was joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE -BLACKMUN, 
yourself, and JUSTICE SCALIA. 5' !.rt'k:.J, li:> ~~ 
II. BACKGROUND 
When this country was formed, the 13 original states 
succeeded to England's sovereign interests in land, which includ-
/3~~ 
ed ownership of all navigable waters and the la~ds beneath them. 
t 
Under this Court's equal footing doctrine, subsequently formed _________ .....____. ......-,......,. .... 
states also receive title to such lands located within their 
boundaries. See Mar tin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. (41 u.s.) 367, 410 
(1842). Thus, even if Congress does not speak to the matter, the 




to the State immediately upon the State's entry into the Union. ~~~~ 
_.. ~ I .J \~ 
Like many other judicial doctrines, this rule rests on the impor-'~
tant place of the States in our federal system: 
To give to the United States the right to transfer to a 
citizen the title to the shores and the soils under the 
navigable waters, would be placing in their hands a 
weapon which might be wielded greatly to the injury of 
State sovereignty, and deprive the States of the power 
to exercise a numerous and important class of pol ice 
powers. But in the hands of the States this power can 
never be used so as to affect the exercise of any na-
tional right --of eminent domain or jurisdiction with 
which the United States have been invested by the Con-
stitution. For [state sovereignty is] but municipal 
power, subject to the Constitution of the United 
States, 'and the laws which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof.'" Pollard's Lesseev. Hagan, 44 u.s. (3 How.) 
212, 230 (1845). 
On several occasions, the Court has attempted to formu-
late the circumstances under which a State's equal footing claim 
-hr H.-.-~ 
might be defeated. The most recent formulation provides 
"'\ 
"that Congress may sometimes convey lands below the 
high-water mark of a navigable water, '[and so defeat 
the title of a new State,] in order to perform interna-
tional obligations, or to effect the improvement of 
such lands for 'the promotion and convenience of com-
merce with foreign nations and among the several 
States, or J:o c~ other public purposes appropr i-
ate to the objects for Which tn e ~n1€ed ~ates hold the 
Territory.' Shively v. Bowlby, 152 u.s. 1, 48 {1894). 
But because control over the property underlying nav i-
gable waters is so strongly identified with the sover-
eign power of government, it will not be held that the 
United States has conveyed such land except because of 
some international duty or public exigency." United 
States v. Montana, 450 u.s. 544, 551-552 {1981) [brack-
ets by Montana court] • 
4. 
Although this formulation suggests a number of different 
situations under which a State might lose, this Court has accept-
ed claims in only two situations: first, when the United States 
never had title in the first place; and second, in Choc~aw Nation 
v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 {1970). The Montana Court's explica-
tion of the bases for the Choctaw decision is instructive. Basi-
cally, on three separate occasions, the United States had estab-
1 ished reservations for the Choctaw. But each time the United 
States subsequently breached its trust and took the land from the 
Indians. To secure the agreement of the Indians to a fourth set-
tlement, the government inserted very strong language in the 
treaty. First, it conveyed the land to the Indians in fee sim-
ple, rather than holding it in trust, the usual practice. Sec-
ond, it pledged that "no Territory or State shall ever have a 
right to pass laws for the government of the Choctaw Nation . . . 
and that no part of the 1 and granted to them shall ever be em-
braced in any Territory or State." Treaty of Dancing Rabbit 
Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333-334. Presented with those 
facts, the Court held that Oklahoma did not have title to naviga-
ble waters on the Choctaw reservation. As the Montana court ex-
. 
~ r .. •' .. 
5. 
plained, the history of that treaty was "unusual." 450 u.s., at 
555, n. 5. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Can a Withdrawal or Reservation ever defeat an Equal Footing 
Claim? 
In this case, the Court must decide whether a reserva-
tion or withdrawal by the United States can deprive a State of 
its subsequent right to the 1 and under the Equal Footing Doc-
trine. Although the Court has never addressed the question, I 
think the tenor of the decisions and the pol icy concerns behind 
the doctrine provide strong support for the State's position. 
----------~~ ---- --
~ the Court repeatedly h;;-s stated that "[a] court~ 
deciding a question of title to the bed of a navigable water must 
begin with a strong presumption in favor of State title," 
--------~ . 
Montana, 450 u.S., at 552. ~ the Court usually character- 1-uR,. qu-r-1-
izes Congress' responsibility over such lands as fiduciary; e.g., ~ /.J ~4·-4 
A:-1. ~~.t~ 
"the United States • • • held [tidelands] only in trust for the~
future States that might be erected out of that territory." Bo- :J~. 
rax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 u.s. 10, 15 (1935). 
Accordingly, Utah argues that, so long as the United 
States still retains ownership of the land at the time of State-
hood, title passes to the State. A mere reservation does not put 
the land beyond reach of the Equal Footing doctrine. Although 
there is little specific support for this argument, I find it /JI!...~ &..-
"' 
persuasive. First, reserv~ by the federal~e...£_nm~nt ~ of ·~~
much less 
V't.o-f~ 
"A reservation ••• means no~ 
more than that the land is shifted from one federal use, and per- ~ ~ 
6. 
haps from one federal managing agency, to another." United 
States v. California, 436 u.s. 32, 40 ( 197 8) • Second, the Equal 
Footing decisions uniformly describe the exception as covering 
only "conveyances." E.g., Montana, 450 u.s., at 551. The reser----- ...... "' 
vations in this case were designed to remove land from the cate-
gory of public lands, susceptible to sale or homesteading, and to 
reserve those lands for reservoirs. This hardly seems 1 ike a 
conveyance. Most importantly, the SG' s position would defeat the 
purpose of the doctrine by allowing the United States to retain 
title to such lands in itself. The principal reason for the doc-
trine was the Court's belief that control over navigable waters 
was an aspect of sovereignty held by States, not by the National 
government. See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 4 4 u.s. ( 3 How.) 212, 
230 ( 1845) (quoted supra, at 3). If the National government r e-
tains lands for some public purpose, with title in itself, it can 
decide at any time to sell the lands to another, or to authorize 
activities that would destroy the nav iga tiona! or recreational 
uses to which the State would put the land. This danger is ap-
parent in this case, in which the United States wishes to sell 
oil leases in Utah Lake. It may be that Utah would do the same, 
but that decision should be for Utah, unless the United States 









1-dr- 2.,' < 
The SG implicitly acknowledges that the language of the 'S &-
Court's cases requires a "conveyance" to escape the Equal Footing ~~ 
e:a-~-
doctrine. He argues that a "reservation" effectively is a con- ~,, i-
veyance from one portion of the federal government to another. I 
am not persuaded. The fact of the matter is that the federal 
7. 
government retains control of the land, and the plenary power to 
return the land to the use it was before the reservation, or to 
put it to some entirely different use. I think these options 
should be foreclosed by the Equal Footing doctrine. 
In sum, I recommend that you adopt a per se rule. I 
realize you are not fond of such rules, but it seems to me that ~ 
such a rule is necessary where the reasons for the rule are coin-
cident with the rule's boundaries. To my untutored eye, it seems 
that the policies behind the Equal Footing doctrine would be 
harmed whenever the federal government retained title in itself 
to navigable waters. Of course, there is no case law specifical-
ly addressing the question. But considering the breadth the 
Court's earlier decisions have given the doctrine, and your af-
finities for federalism concerns, I think it would be difficult 
for you to write an opinin reaching the opposite conclusion. 
B. The Reservation in this case 
) 
Even if you disagree with the conclusion I reached in 
subpart A--and conclude that, for purposes of the Equal Footing 
doctrine, reservations are conveyances--! still would recommend 
that you vote to reverse the judgment of CAlO. As I explained 
above, this Court has indulged the strongest presumptions against 
--------------~-----------------------------------finding that the federal government has disposed of land in a way 
that would defeat a State's Although it may 
be that Congress acquiesced in the disposal in this case, I doubt 
that the evidence is sufficiently overwhelming to meet the burden 
the Court has required in earlier cases. 
....__,. 
8. 
The SG quite persuasively demonstrates that the United 
States would win this case under ordinary criteria of statutory 
interpretation. The language of the 1888 Act authorizes reserva-_____. 
tions for "all lands," with no exception for sovereign lands. 
Major Powell, who reserved Utah Lake, also drafted the statute. 
Congress was presented with documents advising it of the reserva-
tion of Utah Lake and did ~ot object. Finally, in 1890 Congress 
ratified the reservations made under the 1888 Act. The words of 
~ 
the statute do offer some support for Utah's contention that Con-
gress' primary goal was public lands. The last sentence of the 
statute, which describes the effect of the reservation, provides 
that the lands shall not be subject to "entry, settlement or oc-
cupation." Sovereign lands, 1 ike the lakebed, were never subject 
to "entry, settlement or occupation." But I doubt that the in-
ference to be drawn from this clause would normally be enough to 
overcome the import of the preceding phrase "all lands," which 
suggests that any type of land could be reserved. 
But this is not a normal statutory interpretation case. 
t~_ ____ __ 
-----------------------------------The Court has applied a much higher standard to claims that some 
congressional action has defeated a State's equal footing claim. 
"A court • • • must not infer such a conveyance 'unless 
the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made 
plain,' United States v. Holt State Bank, [270 U.S.,] 
at 55, or was rendered 'in clear and especial words,' 
Martin v. Waddell, su~ra, at 411, or 'unless the claim 
confirmed 1n terms ern races the land under the waters 
of the stream,' Packer v. Bird, [137 U.S.,] at 672." 
Montana v. United States, 4500. S., at 552. 
In the past, the Court uniformly has rejected the federal govern-




ter s; nor anything evincing a purpose to depart from the estab-
lished policy ••• of treating such lands as held for the benefit 
of the future state." Holt Bank, supra, at 58-59. 
This case differs little from many other cases in which 
the federal government has sought to assert title to lands be-
Iff! 
neath navigable waters. The statute purports to cover "all 
A.-
lands," but does not explicitly allow reservations of lands be--
neath navigable waters. This Court uniformly has rejected such 
claims, except in the narrow circumstances evidenced in Choctaw 
Nation. The circumstances here betray no such exigency. Al-
though it no doubt was convenient to reserve Utah Lake as a res-
ervoir, the record demonstrates that the Lake's large surface 
area made it ineffective as a reservoir. There is no reason to 
believe that the government's purpose in securing sites for res-
ervoirs could not just as easily have been served without taking 
lands beneath navigable waters. Considering the important state 
interests, I do not think it would be fair to allow Congress to 
dispose of such lands without explicitly stating its intent • 
. 
Congress did not do so here. Thus, I think the State should win. 
II I. CONCLUSION 
The equal footing doctrine reflects a longstanding be-
lief by this Court that control of the lands beneath navigable 
waters is an important aspect of state sovereignty. Although 
,--------
that conclusion might have been questioned initially, it seems so 
deeply ingrained now that changes would be unfair to Western 
~---------------------------states. Applying the Court's past decisions, and the policy con-
elusion on which the doctrine rests, I believe strongly that the 
10. 
Court of Appeals erred. First, I think the Court's past deci-
sions suggest that only complete conveyances to third parties can 
defeat a State's equal footing claim. Second, the Court of Ap-
peals concluded that plain language was sufficient to cover sov-
ereign lands. I think the Court's prior decisions require ex-
pl ici t reference. 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: Ronald 
Re: No. 85-1716, Utah State Lands v. United States 
You asked for a brief memo outlining the statutes in this 
case and summarizing your thinking on the ability of reservations 
to defeat Equal Footing claims. 
I. Congressional Action 
In 1878, Congress recognized that Utah Lake was navigable 
and surveyed it. 
In 1888, Congress passed the Sundry Appropriations Act, 
authorizing the United States Geographical survey (USGS) to re-
serve lands that would be suitable for reservoir sites. The Act 
on its face did not mention the beds of navigable waters. 
In 1890, Congress repealed the authorization to reserve 
sites for reservoirs. In the same Act, it confirmed reservations 
already made. The Act on its face did not mention the beds of 
--------- ~------------------------
navigable waters. Congress did have before it, however, the re-- - .____, port of the USGS, that included a specific designation of the bed 
of Utah Lake, as well as the lands surrounding it. 
In 1896, Congress passed the utah Statehood Act, that re-
served to the United States lands previously reserved under other 
.._ 7-' ----laws, apparently including the sundry Appropriations Act of 1888. 
Nothing on the face of the Act mentions the beds of navigable 
waters. 
II. Reservations and Equal Footing 
page 2. 
1. Congress has the power to retain title in itself to 
the beds of navigable waters. As JUSTICE S'l'EVENS pointed out, 
surely the Constitution permits Congress to retain such lands for 
important military purposes. 
2. But there is nothing inconsistent with an ordinary -reservat!,g n and a State's gaining title under the Equal Footing -- ~
Doctrine. _____.,.. Cong ress' purpose in this case was to prevent settlers 
around the Lake. That could be done without disturbing Utah's 
title to the bed of the lake. 
3. For Congress to retain title in this way--and thus to 
discriminate between the States in the important area of state 
sovereignty of the beds of navigable waters--the face of the rel-
evant statute should include reference to both (i) a reservation 
' 
that includes in so many words the beds of navigable streams, and 
-~ ____.-
(ii) a reservation that is specifically directed against Equal 
Footing rights of any State subsequently to be created from the 
territory in question. 
' ._. I "'-"• 
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From: Justice O'Connor 
APR 3 9 l!&f Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1772 
UTAH DIVISION OF STATE LANDS, PETITIONER v. 
UNITED STATES, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1987] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is whether title to the bed of Utah 
Lake passed to the State of Utah under the equal footing doc-
trine upon Utah's admission to the Union in 1896. 
I 
A 
The equal footing doctrine is deeply rooted in history, and 
the proper application of the doctrine requires an under-
standing of its origins. Under English common law the Eng-
lish Crown held sovereign title to all lands underlying naviga-
ble waters. Because title to such land was important to the 
sovereign's ability to control navigation, fishing and other 
commercial activity on rivers and lakes, ownership of this 
land was considered an essential attribute of sovereignty. 
Title to such land was therefore vested in the sovereign for 
the benefit of the whole people. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 
U. S. 1, 11-14 (1894). When the thirteen colonies became 
independent from Great Britain, they claimed title to the 
lands under navigable waters within their boundaries as the 
sovereign successors to the English Crown. I d., at 15. Be-
cause all subsequently admitted States enter the Union on an 
"equal footing" with the original thirteen States, they too 
hold title to the land under navigable waters within their 
85-1772-0PINION 
2 UTAH DIV. OF STATE LANDS v. UNITED STATES 
boundaries upon entry into the Union. Pollard's Lessee v. 
Hagan, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). 
In Pollard's Lessee this Court announced the principle that 
the United States held the lands under navigable waters in 
the Territories "in trust" for the future States that would be 
created, and in dicta even suggested that the equal footing 
doctrine absolutely prohibited the United States from taking 
any steps to defeat the passing of title to land underneath 
navigable waters to the States. I d., at 230. Half a century 
later, however, the Court disavowed the dicta in Pollard's 
Lessee, and held that the Federal Government had the 
power, under the Property Clause, to convey such land to 
third parties: 
"By the Constitution, as is now settled, the United 
States, having rightfully acquired the Territories, and 
being the only government which can impose laws upon 
them, have the entire dominion and sovereignty, na-
tional and municipal, Federal and state, over all the Ter-
ritories, so long as they remain in territorial 
condition .... 
"We cannot doubt, therefore, that Congress has the 
power to make grants of lands below high water mark of 
navigable waters in any Territory of the United States, 
whenever it becomes necessary to do so in order to per-
form international obligations, or to effect the improve-
ment of such lands for the promotion and convenience of 
the commerce with foreign nations and among the sev-
eral States, or to carry out other public purposes appro-
priate to the objects for which the -United States hold the 
Territory." Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at 48. 
Thus, under the Constitution, the Federal Government could 
defeat a prospective State's title to land under navigable wa-
ters by a pre-statehood conveyance of the land to a private 
party for a public purpose appropriate to the Territory. The 
Court further noted, however, that Congress had never un-
dertaken by general land laws to dispose of land under navi-
85-1772-0PINION 
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gable waters. Ibid. From this, the Court inferred a con-
gressional policy (although not a constitutional obligation) to 
grant away land under navigable waters only "in case of 
some international duty or public exigency." I d., at 50. 
The principles articulated in Shively have been applied a 
number of times by this Court, and in each case we have con-
sistently acknowledged congressional policy to dispose of sov-
ereign lands only in the most unusual circumstances. In rec-
ognition of this policy, we do not lightly infer a congressional 
intent to defeat a State's title to land under navigable waters: 
"[T]he United States early adopted and constantly has 
adhered to the policy of regarding lands under navigable 
waters in acquired territory, while under its sole domin-
ion, as held for the ultimate benefit of future States, and 
so has refrained from making any disposal thereof, save 
in exceptional instances when impelled to particular dis-
posals by some international duty or public exigency. It 
follows from this that disposals by the United States 
during the territorial period are not lightly to be in-
ferred, and should not be regarded as intended unless 
the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made 
very plain." United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 
u. s. 49, 55 (1926). 
We have stated that "[a] court deciding a question of title 
to the bed of a navigable water must ... begin with a strong 
presumption against conveyance by the United States, and 
must not infer such a conveyance unless the intention was 
definitely declared or otherwise made plain, or was rendered 
in clear and especial words, or unless the claim confirmed in 
terms embraces the land under the waters of the stream." 
Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 552 (1981) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, in only a single 
case-Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S. 620 (1970)-
have we concluded that Congress intended to grant sovereign 
lands to a private party. The holding in Choctaw Nation, 
moreover, rested on the unusual history behind the Indian 
. . 
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treaties at issue in that case, and indispensable to the holding 
was a promise to the Indian Tribe that no part of the reserva-
tion would become part of a state. Montana v. United 
States, supra, at 555, n. 5. Choctaw Nation was thus liter-
ally a "singular exception", in which the result depended "on 
very peculiar circumstances." Ibid. 
B 
Utah Lake is a navigable qody of freshwater covering 150 
square miles. It is drained by the Jordan River, which flows 
northward and empties into the Great Salt Lake. Several 
years before the entry of Utah into the Union, "[t]he opening 
of the arid lands to homesteading raised the specter that set-
tlers might claim lands more suitable for reservoir sites or 
other irrigation works, impeding future reclamation efforts." 
California v. United States, 438 U. S. 645, 659 (1978). In 
response, Congress passed the Sundry Appropriations Act of 
1888 (1888 Act), which authorized the United States Geologi-
cal Survey to select "sites for reservoirs and other hydraulic 
works necessary for the storage and utilization of water for 
irrigation and the prevention of floods and overflows." 25 
Stat. 505, 526. The Act further provided that the United 
States would reserve the sites that might be so selected: 
"[A]ll the lands which may hereafter be designated or se-
lected ... for sites for reservoirs, ditches or canals for 
irrigation purposes and all the lands made susceptible of 
irrigation by such reservoirs, ditches or canals are from 
this time henceforth hereby reserved from sale as the 
property of the United States, and shall not be subject 
after the passage of this act, to entry, settlement or 
occupation until further provided by law." 25 Stat., at 
527. 
On April 6, 1889, Major John Wesley Powell, the Director 
of the United States Geological Survey, submitted a report to 
the Secretary of the Interior stating that the "site of Utah 
Lake in Utah County in the Territory of Utah is hereby se-
85-1772-0PINION 
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lected as a reservoir site, together with all lands situate 
within two statute miles of the border of said lake at high 
water." App. 19. The Commissioner of the General Land 
Office subsequently informed the Land Office at Salt Lake 
City of the selection of "the site of Utah Lake" as "a reservoir 
site" and instructed the Land Office "to refuse further entries 
or filing on the lands designated, in accordance with the [Sun-
dry Appropriations] Act of October 2, 1888." I d., at 21. 
The selection of Utah Lake as a reservoir was confirmed in 
the official reports of the Geological Survey to Congress. 
Because the 1888 Act reserved all the land that "may" be 
designated, the 1888 Act haQ.~ctical effect of res_erving 
all of the ublic lands in the st from ublic settlement. 
California v. United States, supra, at 659. Therefore, in 
1890-in response to "a perfect storm of indignation from the 
people of the West," ibid. (quoting 29 Gong. Rec. 1955 
(1877) (statement of Gong. McRae))-Congress repe~d the 
1888 Act in the Sundry Appropriations Act of 1890 (1890 
Act), ch. 837, 26 Stat. 371. In repealing_lhe 1888 Act, how-
ever, Congress provided "that'reservoir sites heretofore lo-
cated or se!eCteashall remain se egated ana reserveCITrom 
entryl)F se ement as provided by the 888 ct . 26 Stat. 
391. Six years later, on January 4, 1896, Utah entered the 
Union. The Utah Enabling Act of July 16, 1894 provided J/J 
that Utah was "to be admitted into the Union on an equal fl/ 
footing with the original states." 28 Stat. 107. 
In 1976, the Bureau of Land Management of the United 
States Department of the Interior issued oil and gas leases 
for lands underlying Utah Lake. Viewing this as a violation 
of its ownership and property rights to the bed of Utah Lake, 
the State of Utah brought suit in the District Court for the 
District of Utah seeking a declaratory judgment that it, 
rather than the United States, had title to the lake bed. 
Utah also sought an injunction against interference with its 
alleged ownership and management rights. In its complaint, 
Utah claimed that on January 4, 1896, by virtu~ of the State's 
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admission into the Union on an equal footing with all other 
states, the State of Utah became the owner of the bed of 
Utah Lake. The United States, in turn, answered that title 
to the lake bed remained in federal ownership by operation of 
Major Powell's selection of the lake as a reservoir site in 
1889. The District Court granted summary judgment for 
the United States, holding that the United States held title to 
the bed of Utah Lake. The District Court found that the 
withdrawal of the bed of Utah Lake in 1889 pursuant to the 
1888 Act defeated Utah's claim to title under the Equal Foot-
ing Doctrine. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed. We granted certiorari,-- U. S. -- (1986), and 
now reverse. 
II 
The State of Utah contends that only a conveyance to a 
third party, and not merel a federal re~land, can 
defeat a State's title to land under navigable waters upon 
entry into the Union. Although this Court has always spo-
ken in terms of a "conveyance" by the United States before 
statehood, we have never decided whether Congress may de-
feat a State's claim to title by a federal reservation or with-
drawal of land under navigable waters. In Shively, this 
Court concluded that the only constitutional limitation on the 
right to grant sovereign land is that such a grant must be for 
a "public purpos[e] appropriate to the objects for which the 
United States hold[s] the Territory." 152 U. S., at 48. In 
the Court's view, the power to make such a grant arose out of 
the Federal Government's power over Territories under the 
Property Clause of the United States Constitution, which 
provides: 
"The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United 
States .... " U. S. Constitution, Art IV, § 3, Cl. 2. 
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The P~se grants Congress plenary power to 
regulate and dispose of land within the Territories, and as-
suredly Congress also has the power to acquire land in aid of 
other powers conferred on it by the Constitution. Under 
Utah's view, however, while the United States could create a 
reservoir site by granting title to Utah Lake to a private en-
tity, the United States could not accomplish the same pur-
pose by a means that would keep Utah Lake under federal 
control. We need not decide that question today, however, 
because even if a reservation of the bed of Utah Lake could 
defeat Utah's claim, it was not accomplished on these facts. 
Although arguably there is nothing in the Constitution to 
prevent the Federal Government from defeating a State's 
title to land under navigable waters by its own reservation 
for a particular use, the strong presumption is against finding 
an intent to defeat the State's title. In Shively and Holt 
State Bank this Court observed that Congress "early adopted 
and constantly has adhered" to a policy of holding land under 
navigable waters "for the ultimate benefit of future States." 
United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, at 55; Shively v. 
Bowlby, supra, at 49--50. Congress, therefore, will defeat 
a future State's entitlement to land under navigable waters 
only "in exceptional instances," and in light of this policy, 
whether faced with a reservation or a conveyance, we simply 
cannot infer that Congress intended to defeat a future State's 
title to land under navigable waters "unless the intention was 
definitely declared or otherwise made very plain." United 
States v. Holt State Bank, supra, at 55. 
When Congress intends to convey land under navigable 
waters to a private party, of necessity it must also intend to 
defeat the future State's claim to the land. When Congress 
reserves land for a particular purpose, however, it may not 
also intend to defeat a future State's title to the land. The 
land remains in federal control, and therefore may still be 
held for the ultimate benefit of future states. Moreover, 
even if the land u~der navigable water passes to the State, 
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the federal government may still control, develop and use the 
waters for its own purposes. Arizona v. California, 373 
U. S. 546, 597-598 (1963). Congress, for example, may in-
tend to create a reservoir, but also intend to let the State ob-
tain title to the land underneath this reservoir upon entry 
into Statehood. Such an intent would not be unusual. In 
Montana v. United States, supra, we found that Congress in-
tended to permit the State to take title to the bed of a naviga-
ble river even though the river was in the midst of an Indian 
Reservation, and in United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 
we held that Congress intended the State to hold title to the 
bed of a navigable lake wholly within the boundaries of an In-
dian Reservation. 
Given the longstanding policy of holding land under naviga- ~ 
ble waters for the ultimate benefit of the States, therefore, 
we would not 'ihfer an intenfto defeat a State's equal footing 
entitlemeirt"fro;; the m~r-e-a-c7t-o-rr'es_e_r_v_a_,I~o-n......,_s-e-n-. ---r ssum-
in~do that a r servatwn o land could be effective to 
overcome the strong presumption against the defeat of state 
title, the United States would not merely be required to es-
tablish that Congress clearly intended to include land under 
navigable waters within the federal reservation; the United 
States would additionally have to establish that Congress af-
firmatively intended to defeat the future State's title to such 
land. 
III 
We conclude that the 1888 Act fails to make sufficiently 
plain either a congressional intent to include the bed of Utah 
Lake within the reservation or an intent to defeat Utah's 
claim to title under the equal footing doctrine. The 1888 Act 
provided that the reserved lands were "reserved from sale as 
the property of the United States, and shall not be subject 
... to entry, settlement or occupation until further provided 
by law." 25 Stat. 505, 527. The words of the 1888 Act did 
not necessarily refer to lands under navigable waters because 
lands under navigable lakes and rivers such as the bed of 
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Utah Lake were already the property of the United States, 
and were already exempt from sale, entry, settlement or 
occupation under the general land laws. As this Court rec-
ognized in Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at 48, "Congress has 
never undertaken by general laws to dispose of" land under 
navigable waters. See also Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153 
U. S. 273, 284 (1894) (applying Shively v. Bowlby, supra, to 
hold that "the general legislation of Congress in respect to 
public lands does not extend to tide lands"); Illinois Central 
Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 437 (1892) (holding that 
"the same doctrine as to the dominion and sovereignty over 
and ownership of lands under navigable waters ... applies, 
which obtains at the common law as to the dominion and sov-
ereignty over and ownership of lands under under tide wa-
ters on the borders of the sea"). Therefore, little purpose 
would have been served by the reservation of the bed of Utah 
Lake. Moreover, the concerns with monopolization and 
speculation that motivated Congress to enact the 1888 Act, 
see P. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development 641 
(1868), had nothing to do with the beds of navigable rivers 
and lakes. 
The intent to reach only land that would otherwise be 
available for sale and settlement is made manifest by the 
Act's proviso: 
"Provided, That the President may at any time in his dis-
cretion by proclamation open any portion or all of the 
lands reserved by this provision to settlement under the 
homestead laws." 25 Stat., at 527. 
This proviso would permit the President to open any land re-
served under the 1888 Act to settlement under the home-
steading laws. We find it inconceivable that Congress in-
tended by this simple proviso to abandon its long-held and 
unyielding policy of never permitting the sale or settlement 
of land under navigable waters under the general land laws. 
Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at 48. The proviso can be inter-
preted consistently with that policy only if lands under navi-
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gable waters were not subject to reservation under the 1888 
Act in the first instance. 
The United States, however, does not rely solely on the I 
1888 Act. It points to references to the bed of Utah Lake 
made by the Geological Survey in reserving Utah Lake, and 
contends that Congress ratified the Geological Survey's res-
ervation of the bed of Utah Lake in the Sundry Appropria-
tions Act of 1890. In the 1890 Act, Congress repealed the 
1888 Act, but also specifically provided that "reservoir sites 
heretofore located or selected shall remain segregated and 
reserved from entry or settlement as provided by [the 1888] 
Act, until otherwise provided by law." 26 Stat. 391. Thus, 
the United States argues, Congress ratified the reservation 
of the lake bed of Utah Lake. 
At first examination, statements made by the Geological ) 
Survey in reserving Utah Lake might seem to support this 
argument. The Tenth Annual Report of the Geological Sur-
vey, which was transmitted to Congress, stated that an indi-
vidual had been sent to examine Utah Lake "with reference 
to its capacity for a reservoir site," in order that he might 
"furnish the specifications for its withdrawal as such under 
the law, so far as the lands covered or overflowed by it or the 
lands bordering upon it were still public lands." App. 25. 
Furthermore, in the Eleventh Annual Report, the Geological 
Survey reported that "the segregation" of Utah Lake "was 
made to include not only the bed but the lowlands up to high 
water." Id., at 29. The Geological Survey's references to 
the "segregation" of the bed of Utah Lake, however, must be 
placed in the proper context. A "segregation" of land simply 
means that the land is no longer subject to disposal under the 
public land laws. See E. Baynard, Public Land Law and 
Procedure § 5.32 (1986). The bed of Utah Lake had already 
been "segregated" by the United States Geological Survey 
even before the adoption of the 1888 Act. The United States 
had surveyed Utah Lake between 1856 and 1878, and hades-
tablished the "meander line"-the mean high-water eleva-
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tion-segregating the land covered by navigable waters from 
land available for public sale and settlement. Record, Vol. 
IV, tab F; United States Bureau of Land Management, Man-
ual of Instructions for the Survey of the Public Lands of the 
United States § 3-115, p. 93 (1973) ("All navigable bodies of 
water and other important rivers and lakes are segregated 
from the public lands at mean high-water elevation"). Given 
that the bed of Utah Lake was already "segregated" from 
public sale, the United States Geological Survey Reports are 
best understood as reporting the further segregation of the 
lands adjacent to the lake which, until the reservation of 
Utah Lake in 1889, had not been segregated and thus had 
been available for public settlement. In the Eleventh An-
nual Report, for example, the Geological Survey's announce-
ment that "the segregation" of Utah Lake "includ[ed] not 
only the bed but the lowlands up to mean high water" in our 
view simply announced an increase in the segregated portion 
of Utah Lake. App. 29. Because the bed of Utah Lake had 
been segregated as early as 1878, the Geological Survey's 
statement that the lake bed was segregated need not be 
taken as a statement that the bed was included within the 
reservation. Similarly, the Tenth Annual Report's state-
ment that a Geological Survey employee would furnish speci-
fications for a withdrawal "so far as the lands covered or 
overflowed by [Utah Lake] or the lands bordering upon it 
were still public lands," id., at 25 (emphasis supplied), is con-
sistent with an intention that the Geological Survey would 
withdraw those lands still subject to public settlement, i. e., 
the lands that were "still public lands." See E. Baynard, 
supra, at § 1.1, p. 2 ("Most enduringly, the public lands have 
been defined as those lands subject to sale or other disposal 
under the general land laws") (emphasis in original). Be-
cause the bed of Utah Lake was not at that time "public land" 
subject to settlement, we think it doubtful that the Tenth An-
nual Report should be understood as informing Congress that 
the Geological Survey had reserved the bed of Utah Lake. 
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The record reflects that the Geological Survey's concern in 
1889 was not with the bed of Utah Lake; rather its concern 
was that the land adjacent to the lake was then available for 
public sale and settlement under the general land laws. In 
Major Powell's letter to the Department of the Interior an-
nouncing the selection of Utah Lake as a reservoir site he did 
not discuss the bed of Utah Lake. Instead, he observed that 
"further entries of the lands adjoining Utah Lake will have a 
tendency to defeat the purposes of [the 1888 Act] and ob-
struct the use of the lake as a natural reservoir," App. 20, 
and that "speedy action" was necessary to avoid settlement. 
Ibid. Thus, Major Powell recommended that "the Register 
of the Land Office at Salt Lake City be instructed to refuse 
entries of public land within" two miles of the lake. Ibid. 
The local land office was so instructed by the Department of 
the Interior. Id., at 21. 
We further find no clear demonstration that Congress in-
tended to ratify any reservation of the bed of Utah Lake in 
the 1890 Act. At best, the United States points to only scat-
tered references to the bed of Utah Lake in the material sub-
mitted to Congress, and presents no unambiguous evidence 
that members of Congress actually understood these refer-
ences as pointing to a reservation of the bed of Utah Lake. 
As with the 1888 Act, the language of the 1890 Act is consist-
ent with the view that only land available for entry and sale 
was reserved: 
"reservoir sites heretofore located or selected shall re-
main segregated and reserved from entry or settlement 
as provided by said act, until otherwise provided by 
law .... " 26 Stat. 371, 391. 
In sum, the 1890 Act can be understood as ratifying a res-
ervation of the bed of Utah Lake only by ignoring the lan-
guage of the 1890 Act and by taking the Geological Survey's 
references to the bed of Utah Lake out of context. Under 
our precedents, however, we cannot so lightly infer the res-
ervation of land under navigable waters. We conclude, 
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therefore, that the 1890 Act no more "definitely declared or 
otherwise made plain" Congress' intention to reserve Utah 
Lake than had the 1888 Act. Montana v. United States, 
supra, at 552 (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 
supra, at 55). 
IV 
Even if Congress did intend to reserve the bed of Utah J 
Lake in either the 1888 Act or the 1890 Act, however, <Con-
gress did not clearly express an intention to defeat Utah's 
claim to the lake e un er the equal footin doctrine upon 
entry into statehood. T e nited States points to no evi-
dence of a congressional intent to defeat Utah's entitlement 
to the bed of Utah Lake, and the structure and the history of 
the 1888 Act strongly suggest that Congress had no such in-
tention. On. its face, the 1888 Act does not purport to defeat 
the entitlement of future states to any land reserved. In-
stead, the Act merely provides that any reserved land is "re-
served from sale" and "shall not be subject ... to entry, set-
tlement or occupation;" it makes no mention of the States' 
entitlement to the beds of navigable rivers and lakes upon 
entry into statehood. The transfer of title of the bed of Utah 
Lake to Utah, moreover, would not prevent the federal gov-
ernment from subsequently developing a reservoir or water 
reclamation project at the lake in any event. See, e. g., Ari-
zona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 451-452 (1931) (holding 
that the United States has power to construct a dam and res-
ervoir on a navigable river). 
Finally, the broad sweep of the 1888 Act cannot be recon-
ciled with an intent to defeat the States' title to the land 
under navigable waters. As noted above, the 1888 Act "had 
the practical effect of reserving all of the public lands in the 
West from settlement." California v. United States, supra, 
at 659. In light of the congressional policy of defeating the 
future states' title to the lands under navigable waters only 
"in exceptional instances" in case of "international duty or 
public exigency," United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, at 
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55, we find it inconceivable that Congress intended to defeat 
the future states' title to all such land in the western United 
States. Such an action would be wholly at odds with Con-
gress' policy of holding this land for the ultimate benefit of 
the future states. 
In sum, Congress did not definitely declare or otherwise 
make very plain either its intention to reserve the bed of 
Utah Lake or to defeat Utah's title to the bed under the 
Equal Footing Doctrine. Accordingly, we hold that the bed 
of Utah Lakes passed to Utah upon that state's entry into 
statehood on January 4, 1896. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is 
Reversed. 
April 30, 1987 
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